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Acronyms
2
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DD Displacement Damage 
GEO Geostationary Earth Orbit 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LET Linear Energy Transfer
MBU Multi-Bit Upset 
MCU Multi-Cell Upset 
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging 
  
    
  
   
    
   
    
   
  
    
     
   
    
   
    
  
  
  
     
RDM Radiation Design Margin
RHA Radiation Hardness Assurance 
SEB Single Event Burnout
SEDR Single Event Dielectric Rupture
SEE Single Event Effects 
SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt
SEGR Single Event Gate Rupture 
SEL Single Event Latchup 
SOA Safe Operating Area
TID Total Ionizing Dose 
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
3NEPP - Small Mission Efforts
Reliable 
Small 
Missions
Model-Based 
Mission 
Assurance 
(MBMA)
• W NASA R&M 
Program
Best 
Practices and 
Guidelines
COTS and 
Non-Mil Data
SEE 
Reliability 
Analysis CubeSat 
Mission 
Success 
Analysis
CubeSat 
Databases
Working 
Groups
* NASA Reliability & Maintainability
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Outline
• New Space and SmallSat Considerations
• The Natural Space Radiation Environment Hazard
• Radiation Effects on Micro-Electronics
• Hardness Assurance, as a Discipline, with its Challenges
• New Technologies
• New Architectures
• Unbound Risks
• Building Smart Requirements
• Risk Acceptance and Guidance
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La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
So
la
r E
ve
nt
s 
&
 A
ct
iv
ity
Tr
ap
pe
d 
R
ad
ia
tio
n
New Space & SmallSats – Same Old Radiation 
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• The need for Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)
• Radiation effects are a mix of disciplines, evolve with 
technologies and techniques
• Misinterpretation of failure modes / misuse of 
available data can lead to over/under design
• New mission concepts and SmallSat paradigm
• Challenges identified in the past are here to stay; 
adoption of new technologies are often the risk 
driver
• Commercial Space, Small missions, Constellations 
will benefit from detailed hazard definition and 
mission specific requirements
• RHA flow doesn’t change, risk acceptance needs to 
be tailored 
• Some Top Level Resources
• NPR 7120.5 – NASA Agency Program Management
• GPR 8705.4 – Goddard Risk Assessments
https://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov
https://www.nasa.gov/van-allen-probes
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NASA, ESA, and L. Hustak (STScI)To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and 
Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
New Space – New Point of View
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ESSCON : Eccofet
Component Grades are MergingSmallSats / Constellations / Swarms
Risk acceptance is being used as a means 
to enable innovation
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
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Who Needs This Guidance?
• Universities / CubeSats
• May be first-time designers, or previous missions did 
not have requirements
• Schedule driven, limited time for development
• Rideshares – could end up in multiple environments
• Space Agencies / Government
• More designs in new destinations
• Cost savings of SmallSat platform, with more reliable 
outcome
• More risk acceptance
• Device / Subsystem Manufacturers
• Product / Device offerings (middle of the road seems 
to be the target)
• Fault tolerance in designs
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NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center/Bill Hrybyk
Michael Swartwout, SLU CubeSat Database
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Notional Questions to Keep in Mind
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• What are the radiation risks: 
• What is the hazard? 
• What are the challenges?
• What can you do to reduce the risk 
for a given hazard?
• How do similar systems/devices 
react in the space environment?
• What does changing that radiation 
environment mean for success?
• Need availability throughout the 
mission or at specific times? 
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Trapped Particles in 
Planetary Magnetic Fields
9
Natural Space Radiation Environment
Galactic Cosmic Rays Solar Activity
Energetic supernovae remnants 
(~GeV, Z=1-92) 
Originate outside of our solar 
system
Solar Wind, Solar Cycle
CMEs (proton rich)
Flares (heavy ion rich) 
Fluctuate with Solar Activity and Events
Not a perfect dipole
Protons and Electrons trapped at different 
L-shell values and energies
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Spacecraft Charging, Ionizing Dose, Non-Ionizing 
Dose, Single Event Effects, Drag, Surface Erosion, 
Debris/Micro-Meteoroid Impacts, Thermal Cycles
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Natural Space Radiation Environment
• Plasma
• Particle Radiation
• Neutral Gas Particles
• UV and X-Ray 
• Orbital Debris
Degradation of micro-electronics
Degradation of optical components
Degradation of solar cells
Data corruption
Noise on images
System shutdowns or resets
Circuit Damage
Part tolerances exceeded
wear-out
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
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Natural Space Radiation Environment
• Particle Radiation
Degradation of micro-electronics
Degradation of optical components
Degradation of solar cells
Data corruption
Noise on images
System shutdowns or resets
Circuit Damage
Part tolerances exceeded
wear-out
DDD/
Typical Bathtub
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Single EventsDegradation
Units explanation
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• Absorbed Dose (rad(Si))
1 rad = 100 erg/g = 0.01 J/kg; 100 rad = 1 Gy
• Always specified for a particular material 
1 rad(SiO2), 10 krad(Si), 100 Gy(H2O)
• This is not exposure (R), or dose equivalent (Sv)
• Non Ionizing Energy Loss (NIEL)
• Fluence (p/cm2)
Number of particles per unit area
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• Linear Energy Transfer (LET) 
• Stopping Power Normalized to target material
• Units are MeV.cm2/mg
• Rate (/device or /bit per time interval)
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Degradation Contributors vs. Single Event
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• Cumulative effects 
• Depend highly on which contributors and 
duration in their presence
• Mimic wear-out/aging 
• NIEL and TID must be accounted for
• Typical destinations (LEO, GEO)
• LEO at low altitude/inclination is more 
protected by the Geomagnetic field
• Proximity to the poles & SAA show a large 
variability in dose despite short mission 
durations
• Electrons and their braking radiation are the 
big offender in Geostationary orbits (don’t 
forget about spacecraft charging…)
• Note that
• A little bit of shielding goes a long way 
• Altitude plays a huge role when in/near the 
radiation belts (even transiting)
• Beyond Geomagnetic field, highly variable 
solar environment contributions (Solar cycle)
Degradation has a strong dependence on 
where you go, not just how long you are on 
orbit 1
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Degradation vs. Single Event Contributors
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• One particle causes the effect
• Random in nature, particle must traverse sensitive 
structure within device and have sufficient charge creation 
along its path
• Shielding doesn’t do so much for highly energetic particles
• Device technology can be dependent on particle species
• Typical Destinations (LEO, GEO)
• Again altitude plays a role; for some devices that is a 
direct threat
• You are exposed to more GCR + Solar contribution as 
geomagnetic protection is reduced
• Natural phenomena (SAA, magnetic poles) are temporal 
drivers
• Note that
• There will be a background rate, solar cycle dependence, 
solar event rate, increased rate for poles or SAA – not just 
one rate to consider
• Always dependent on mission
Single event contributors benefit very little from 
shielding, have dependence on materials near the 
sensitive volume S
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Summary of Environmental Hazards
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GEO Yes No Severe Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 
LEO (low-
incl) No Yes Moderate No No No 
Not 
usual No No No No 
LEO Polar No Yes Moderate Yes Yes No Not usual No No No No 
International 
Space Station No Yes Moderate 
Yes - 
partial Minimal Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Interplanetary 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
During 
phasing 
orbits; 
Possible 
Other 
Planet 
Yes Yes No Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe 
Exploration – 
Lunar, Mars, 
Jupiter 
Phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
During 
phasing 
orbits 
Yes Yes Possibly Yes Maybe No Yes Yes 
 https://radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/radhome/papers/SSPVSE05_LaBel.pdf
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Environment
LEO Equatorial LEO Polar (Sun Sync) GEO / Interplanetary
M
is
si
on
Li
fe
tim
e >
 3
 Y
ea
rs Moderate Dose /Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
High Dose /
Higher GCR, High Energy 
Trapped Protons in SAA and 
Poles, Some Solar Proton 
dependence for variation
High Dose / 
High GCR, High Solar Proton 
Variability
1-
3 
Ye
ar
s Manageable Dose / 
Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose / 
Higher GCR, High Energy 
Trapped Protons in SAA and 
Poles, Some Solar Proton 
dependence for variation
High Dose / High GCR, High 
Solar Proton Variability
< 
1 
Ye
ar
Manageable Dose / 
Attenuated GCR, Trapped 
Proton, SAA, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose / Higher GCR, 
High Energy Trapped Protons 
in SAA and Poles, Some Solar 
Proton dependence for 
variation
Moderate Dose /
High GCR, High Solar Proton 
Variability
Radiation Hazard Contributors for Dose and SEE
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Radiation Effects on Active Microelectronic Devices
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• Cumulative effects and single event effects can both be 
permanently damaging
• TID/DDD lead to wear-out of device operation and degrade 
devices beyond acceptable operations internally and externally
• Single Event Effects can be catastrophic instantaneously by 
turning on parasitic devices within the semiconductor or inducing 
electric field across dielectrics that eventually break down
• Synergistic effects can make ground based testing very difficult
• Destructive Single Event Effects (SEEs)
• Irreversible processes 
• Terms: Latchup, Burnout, Gate Rupture
• Non-Destructive SEEs
• Lead to interruptions in operation and/or errors leading to 
unknown state spaces or loss of science / mission if not 
accounted for
• Terms: Functional Interrupt, Transients, Upsets
• Short Courses / Presentations / Papers / IEEE
• NSREC, RADECS,  SEE/MAPLD, NEPP ETW, HEART, 
GOMAC, SPWG, MRQW, SERESSA
Megan Casey - https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/26196/2014-561-Casey-
Final-Web-Pres-ETW-Diodes-TN16278_v2.pdf
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and 
Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Device and Particle Interraction
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Oxide
Metal
Oxide
Metal
Recombination Nuclear Displacement Oxide Charge Trapping
Brock J. LaMeres, Colin Delaney, Matt Johnson, Connor Julien, Kevin Zack, Ben Cunningham Todd Kaiser, Larry Springer, David Klumpar, "Next on the Pad: RadSat – A Radiation Tolerant 
Computer System," Proceedings of the 31st Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites, Logan UT, USA, Aug. 5-10, 2017, paper: SSC17-III-11, 
URL: http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3618&context=smallsat
SEE Cumulative
Field 
Oxide+ + +    - - -
+ +    - -
+    -
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Table of SEE susceptibility
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Ray Ladbury, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170006865.pdf
List is not exhaustive, but new failure modes are found in new devices, so it would not be 
possible to capture all
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Outline
• New Space and SmallSat Considerations
• The Natural Space Radiation Environment Hazard
• Radiation Effects on Micro-Electronics
• Hardness Assurance, as a Discipline, with its Challenges
• New Technologies
• New Architectures
• Unbound Risks
• Building Smart Requirements
• Risk Acceptance and Guidance
20To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
The People: Radiation Effects Engineers
Materials
• Material Property 
degradations with 
radiation
• Energy loss in 
materials
Device Physics
• Charge transport
• Device Process 
Dependencies 
• Charge 
dependency of 
device operation
Electrical 
Engineering
• Part to part 
interconnections
• Understanding 
circuit response
• Device functions 
and taxonomy
Systems 
Engineering
• Requirements
• System Level 
Impacts
• Understanding 
interconnections
• Understanding 
functionality
Space Physics
• Space weather
• Environment 
models/modeling
• Radiation Sources 
and variability 
The Job: Watch out for the ‘ilities
Survivability
• Must survive until needed
• Entire mission?
• Screening for early 
failures in components
Availability
• Must perform when 
necessary
• Subset of time on orbit
• Operational modes
• Environmental response
Reliability
• Resultant of all
• Many aspects and 
disciplines
• Known unknowns
Criticality
• Impact to the system
• Part or subsystem 
function
• Mission objectives
21To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) Overview
22
(LaBel)
RHA consists of all 
activities undertaken to 
ensure that the 
electronics and materials 
of a space system 
perform to their design
specifications throughout 
exposure to the mission 
space environment
(Poivey)
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
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• Define the Environment
– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
K.A. LaBel, A.H. Johnston, J.L. Barth, R.A. Reed, C.E. Barnes, “Emerging 
Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) issues: A NASA approach for space 
flight programs,” IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci., pp. 2727-2736, Dec. 1998.
Radiation Hardness Assurance Flow
RHA consists of all 
activities undertaken to 
ensure that the 
electronics and materials 
of a space system 
perform to their design
specifications throughout 
exposure to the mission 
space environment
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) 
Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
RHA Challenges…
Not So Small
• Always in a dynamic environment
• New Technologies
- Device Topology / Speed / Power
- Increased COTS parts / subsystem usage
• New Mission Architectures
- Profiles of mission life, objective, and cost are evolving
- Oversight gives way to insight in some mission 
classifications
- Ground systems, do no harm, hosted payloads
- Similarity and heritage data requirement widening
• Quantifying Risk
- Translation of system requirements to radiation trades 
can be problematic
- Determining appropriate mitigation level (operational, 
system,  circuit/software, device, material, etc.)
Unbound radiation risks are likely
24To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
New Technologies - New Susceptibilities
• Feature Size / Critical Charge –
• Will we now have sensitivity to muons? Low 
energy protons?
• 3D Stacking/Structures 
• Deep sensitive volumes
• New materials
• Testing Challenges
• Complexity (e.g. SoCs)
• Speed of interfaces 
• Obfuscation of state space
• Flux / Range of beam @ facilities
Without a lot of part information you may not 
have a representative characterization of the 
radiation threats to the device or technology.
25
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To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and 
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Allowable LossesSingle Strain
New Mission Architectures - How Many to Succeed?
Redundancy alone does not remove the threat, adds complexity 
26
vs 
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Quantifying Risk – Likelihood vs. Consequence
From Risk Assessment GPR 7120.5
27
Can only get there with enough information about the system or the chosen device, need to 
have a known hazard and a known response
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
• Hardness Assurance is the 
practice of designing for 
radiation effects
• What it takes to overcome the 
radiation challenges
• Competing failure modes
28
RHA Flow Doesn’t Change With Accepted Risk
(After Poivey)
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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• Hardness Assurance is the 
practice of designing for 
radiation effects
• What it takes to overcome the 
radiation challenges
• Competing failure modes
• Focus for impact on risk 
acceptance:
- Failure Awareness
- Countermeasures/Mitigation
- Mission Requirements
29
RHA Flow Doesn’t Change With Accepted Risk
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Focus For Risk Acceptance
• Failure Awareness
• Know your hazard from the natural environment
• Know your devices potential failure mechanisms or response (data)
• Countermeasures and Mitigation
• Where are they necessary?
• Where are they effective?
• At what level (part, card, box, mission)
• Smart Requirements – and Eventually Smart Trades
30To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
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Free-Field
Environment 
Definition
Internal
Environment 
Definition
Shielding
System Sub-system Parts
Known Hazard
Define and Evaluate the Hazard
Performance 
Requirements
Reliability
Requirements
Parametric
Requirements
Known Risk
Derive Smart Requirements
Failure Awareness
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and 
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Define and Evaluate the Hazard
32
• Define the Environment
– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
Environment Severity/Mission Lifetime
Low Medium High
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h
Manageable
Dose /
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
Moderate Dose /
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
High Dose / 
SEE impact to 
survivability or 
availability
M
ed
iu
m Manageable
Dose / 
SEE needs
mitigation
Moderate Dose / 
SEE needs 
mitigation
High Dose / 
SEE needs 
mitigation
Lo
w Manageable Dose / 
SEE do no harm 
Moderate Dose /
SEE do no harm
High Dose /
SEE do no harm
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Environment Severity/Mission Lifetime
Low Medium High
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Dose-Depth / 
Ray-trace
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
for typical 
conditions
Dose-Depth / 
Ray-trace
GCR and proton 
Spectra for all 
conditions
Ray-Trace for 
subsystem / 
GCR and proton 
Spectra for all 
conditions
M
ed
iu
m Dose-Depth / 
GCR and proton 
spectra for 
background
Dose-Depth /
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
For background
Dose-Depth 
evaluation at 
shielding / 
All spectra
conditions
Lo
w
Similar mission 
dose, same 
solar cycle / 
GCR spectra
Dose-Depth /
GCR spectra
Dose-Depth /
GCR and 
Proton Spectra
For background
• Define the Environment
– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
Derive Smart Requirements
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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– External to the spacecraft
• Evaluate the Environment
– Internal to the spacecraft
• Define the Requirements
– Define criticality factors
• Evaluate Design/Components
– Existing data/Testing
– Performance characteristics
• “Engineer” with Designers
– Parts replacement/Mitigation schemes
• Iterate Process
– Review parts list based on updated knowledge
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Mitigation and Countermeasure Optimization
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Building Requirements
• Requirements by Environment
• Requirements by Technology
• Cases that may need additional considerations
35To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Requirements by Environment
36
• Van Allen Belts
- Can lead to high doses in a short 
mission: Jovian 
- Can lead to spatially dependent SEE 
responses: South Atlantic Anomaly
• Solar Orbits
- Solar Events, highly dynamic, 
energetic, directional
- Solar Wind, will depend on the solar 
cycle
In essence the requirements are always 
driven by the environment, some more 
than others create a unique challenge
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
Requirements by Technology
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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• Technologies exhibit specific physics of failure
- Not easy to group them all
- Opto-electronics - Displacement in the material
- Bipolar - Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity
- Digital CMOS - Latchup and SEFI
- Power devices - SEGR/SEB
• Test Data requirements
- Failure distributions, often not enough parts
- Destructive effects are one data point, 
variability from part to part 
- Statistics of the fit for rate calculations
Requirements should only be made applicable 
to the technologies that need to meet mission 
objectives and can benefit
Why you can’t relax an LET requirement
• Not like wear-out, flat-line risk
• Rate calculations are not the same 
for DSEE vs. Non-destructive
o Data are a limiting factor
o One part = one data point
• When you require by LET: 
o Spectrum from environment is then 
imparted on sensitive volumes
o LET increases at angle – critical charge is 
what we are trying to determine
o Deep SV doesn’t get same LET each time
o CRÈME Calculation integrates
38Ray Ladbury, NSREC2017 SC,
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Considerations for SEE Requirements
39
• SEE, SET
o Don’t harm downstream parts, or accumulate
o Tailored Filtering, EDAC, or Scrubbing 
• SEL
o Environment and technology driven, risk avoidance
o Protection circuitry / diode deratings
• SEGR, SEB
o Effect driven, normally incident is worst case
o Testing to establish Safe Operating Area (SOA)
• MBU, MCU, SEFI, Locked States 
o Application Voltage or Pattern dependence
o Watchdogs / reset capability
• Proton SEE susceptible parts need evaluated in detail:
https://nepp.nasa.gov/files/25401/Proton_RHAGuide_NASAAug09.pdf
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So you don’t care about dose?
40
Maybe you do!
• Maybe degradation of a part beyond 
usage is okay?
• Did you forget about DDD?
• Short Mission, common failure mode
• Low mass budget, can optimize 
shielding if you have failure 
distribution of parts.
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Say you want to survive a flare? Think Availability
41
• Don’t dose out during storm (nor the full mission) 
• Calculate the dose (TID/DDD) of the mission in full - 95% confidence level 
recommended
• Calculate the dose contribution from N number of events (protons & x-rays) 
• If dose from N is > 5% of the total dose, increase confidence level of full mission model
• Don’t destructively fail from a single particle during the storm (nor the full 
mission)
• Standard risk-avoidant SEE approach: no destructive effects allowed 
• LET threshold for single event latchup (SEL) > 75 MeV.cm2/mg
• LET threshold for single event burnout, gate rupture, dielectric rupture (SEB, SEGR, 
SEDR) > 37 MeV.cm2/mg (particles must come from normal incidence to cause effect)
• If you have non-destructive single event upsets, they can’t overwhelm critical 
instruments/systems during the storm
• Rate calculation requires part data representative of the application, looking for cross-
section over LET. 
• If a parts’ LET threshold is anywhere from 20 to 75 MeV.cm2/mg, need heavy ion rate 
• If a parts’ LET threshold is below 20, need direct ionization from protons (can be built-
in to heavy ion calculation) and indirect ionization from recoil ions contribution to rate 
(need proton data) – make sure packaging materials don’t add to this
• Do you need to mitigate or not – confirm that event rates are not higher than mitigation 
(Markov process… i.e. EDAC beats the number accrued, scrub rate is faster than 
critical number of upset accumulation)
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Risk Acceptance – Data Available?
• Part Classifications Growing
• Mil/Aero vs. Industrial vs. Medical
• Automotive vs. Commercial vs. Modified HiRel
• Substitute in COTS
• Now you have another degree of separation
• Failure modes not fully understood
• Unlikely to have historical data
• Similarity data no applicable due to fab, process, 
or design rules
• Cost of testing usually too high
Without traceability you may be depending on non-
representative data.
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Risks abound, would you know the root cause?
• Parts
• Parametric degradation and leakage currents allowable in application?
• Downstream/peripheral circuits considered?
• Reset/refresh capability?
• Mitigation within too complex?
• Predicted radiation response unknown– loss of part functionality critical?
• Subsystem
• Criticality to mission that the subsystem work?
• Interfaces allow you to get to a known state if all goes wrong?
• System
• Increased power dissipation a mission ender?
• Availability outweighed by error circumvention?
• Data retention through reboots? What if there is science data loss?
• Communications interruptions overwhelm? 
• Navigation or Attitude determination unable to deal with faults?
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When do you test?
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• Divine your risk threshold
• There’s a doc coming for that… 
radhome.gsfc.nasa.gov/nepp.nasa.gov
• Unknown failure modes that would not be 
acceptable to the mission
• Known unknowns can be carried as a risk if you 
already know that the outcome is mitigated at the 
board or box level
• New technologies should be identified early on
• Fault propagation may be the problem you wish to 
mitigate
• This can include cumulative effects!
• Fault injection may not be able to cover the state 
space
• Destructive single event effects are an obvious 
target
• Can you tolerate a part replacement in your design 
cycle?
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
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Environment
LEO Equatorial LEO Polar (Sun Sync) GEO / Interplanetary
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Notional SmallSat Radiation Guidelines
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Model Based Systems Engineering as a Tool
FPG
A
FPG
A
DDR
DDR
DDR
DDR
Goal Structured Notation (GSN)
• Concept of operations 
• Requirements and Availability are 
fed down correctly to subsystem
• Evidence is presented
• Assumptions are tracked
Environment, Device,  & Design
• Models and Test Data are 
brought together to get rates of 
upset / failure distributions
• Resources and Utilization are 
the scaling factors with criticality
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Systems Modeling Language
• Description of System 
Connections and Dependencies
• Receives GSN readily
• Fault propagation can be 
identified
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THANK YOU
michael.j.campola@nasa.gov
47
To be presented by Michael J. Campola at the 2019 SEE-MAPLD Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and Military and Aerospace Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, 
La Jolla, CA, May 20-23, 2019.
